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of Informal Rulemaking
In recent years, each branch of the federal government has attempted or
considered attempts to force internal management standards upon admin-
istrative agencies in order to limit the agencies' rulemaking discretion.
Congress is once again considering legislation' to reiterate and extend the
requirements of recent Executive Orders that establish such standards for
the promulgation of major rules.2 Courts have remanded agency action
that fails to comply with a similar management model. ' None of these
attempts, however, has been wholly or even largely successful.
This Note argues for a coordination of efforts through legislative en-
dorsement of judicial review of agency internal management requirements.
Scant attention has been paid to this idea; within the executive and legis-
lative branches, it has been opposed because of fears of judicial incompe-
tence and judicially caused delay. 4 This Note suggests that objections to
judicial review are based on a failure to perceive the similarities between
standards of judicial review already applied and internal management
standards enacted or being considered for enactment. It concludes that leg-
islative endorsement of judicial review of internal management standards
can help ensure that the internal management model is effectively imple-
mented without creating substantial delay.
I. Checking Agency Discretion Through Internal Management
Standards
Proposals for internal management standards are the product of recent
reexaminations of the efficacy and legitimacy of federal administrative
agencies.' During the first six decades of this century, agencies were sub-
1. See infra pp. 748-52.
2. See infra pp. 746-49.
3. See infra pp. 744-46.
4. See infra pp. 761-63.
5. See Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667,
1669-88, 1711-1760 (1975) (summarizing and analyzing criticisms of agency performance and several
proposed solutions).
The Yale Law Journal
ject to few checks on their authority.6 The paucity of controls was justified
initially on the basis that agencies did nothing more than follow the statu-
tory mandates of Congress; that is, they had little discretion to check.7
Confronted during the 1930's with broad congressional mandates, this
simple justification of agency independence gave way to the "expertise"
justification,' which held that the apparent discretion was strictly circum-
scribed by the rigors of professionalism. Congress had to give broad man-
dates to agencies because intelligent regulation required the development
of expertise concerning the problem to be regulated and the flexibility to
respond to resulting changes in the understanding of the problem. But
administrators, being professionals, were constrained by their own exper-
tise: professionalism would lead them ineluctably to the solutions that con-
temporaneous knowledge demonstrated were best.
Studies of agencies during the last twenty years have cast considerable
doubt on this model of administrative behavior.' Administrative agencies
do not always act as expert implementers of given norms, adapting the
method of implementation to changing circumstances, but often must bal-
ance competing values or choose among them."0 Furthermore, instead of
being responsive to new fact, policy or value arguments, agencies have
tended over time to become institutionally committed to particular view-
points or regulatory approaches. They resist challenges to such entrenched
positions by making outside participation in agency decisionmaking diffi-
cult, by failing to respond to new facts and policy arguments, and by us-
6. Only the judiciary provided a routine means of checking agencies, and its checks were very
weak. See, e.g., Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 186 (1935) (presuming
existence of facts necessary to justify regulation of containers of agricultural products and refusing to
examine closely purported policy ends of the regulation); Superior Oil Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n,
322 F.2d 601, 619 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 922 (1964) (upholding Federal Power
Commission's summary rejection of independent natural gas producer's rate filings based upon com-
mission expertise developed through studies and experience).
7. See Reagan v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 394 (1894) (railroad rate commis-
sion with broad powers is "merely an administrative board . . . carrying into effect the will of the
State"); Berle, The Expansion of American Administrative Law, 30 HARV. L. REV. 430, 430-31
(1917).
8. See, e.g., Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941) ("Because the relation of
remedy to policy is peculiarly a matter for administrative competence, courts. . . must guard against
the danger of sliding unconsciously from the narrow confines of law into the more spacious domain of
policy.. . . [The National Labor Relations Act] entrusts to an expert agency the maintenance and
promotion of industrial peace."); J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 10-17, 98-99 (1938);
Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy in the Administrative Process, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1041, 1058 (1975);
Stewart, supra note 5, at 1678.
9. See generally Stewart, supra note 5, at 1682-88, 1711-16.
10. See SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 4 (1977) [hereinafter cited as STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION]; Bazelon,
Coping with Technology Through the Legal Process, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 817, 819 (1977); Freed-
man, supra note 8, at 1054, 1060; Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regu-
lation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1369, 1372, 1427 (1977).
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ing the claim of expertise to shield their decisions from scrutiny."
These descriptions of agency behavior suggest serious problems of legit-
imacy and efficacy. To the extent that public policy reflecting important
value choices is made by unchecked officials with only minimal and per-
haps one-sided public input, ideals of representative democracy are
threatened.' 2 To the extent that agencies do not develop and utilize exper-
tise, their efficacy is subject to doubt.'3
The recognition of these problems has stimulated substantial thought
concerning reform of the administrative process. One type of proposed re-
form would increase direct control over the substance of agency policies.
Specific techniques that have been advocated include: increasing legislative
control through revival of the non-delegation doctrine,'4 or the use of leg-
islative vetoes'" or sunset legislation;'6 increasing presidential power to re-
view, modify, and reverse agency policy;" and increasing judicial scrutiny
by removing presumptions of validity accorded agency determinations of
fact and law.'" Several of these suggestions are of questionable consistu-
tionality.' 9 All have been attacked as unworkable or inefficacious.
2°
11. One form of this theory suggests that agencies are "captured," through bribery, by the inter-
ests they regulate. Other forms of the theory emphasize the agency's limited sources of information
and other resources, as well as the structure of risks and rewards facing the bureaucrat. See STUDY ON
FEDERAL REGULATION, supra note 10, pt. 3, at 1-5; Freedman, supra note 8, at 1053-56; Stewart,
supra note 5, at 1682, 1684-86.
12. See Freedman, supra note 8, at 1044, 1055-56; McGowan, Congress, Court and Control of
Delegated Power, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1119, 1130-31 (1977); Stewart, supra note 5, at 1672, 1676,
1684-87.
13. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (remanding regula-
tion limiting certain effluent discharges of pulp and paper mills when regulation was based on compu-
tations conceded to be in error); Getman & Goldberg, The Myth of Labor Board Expertise, 39 U.
CHI. L. REV. 681 (1972).
14. See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 672-
76 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); T. LOW!, THE END OF LIBERALISM 297-98 (1969); Wright,
Book Review, 81 YALE L.J. 575, 586-87 (1972) (reviewing K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A
PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969)). See generally A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495 (1935) (striking down § 3 of National Industrial Recovery Act as unconstitutional delegation
of legislative power).
15. See, e.g., S. 104, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S304 (1979); J. MASHAW & R.
MERRILL, INTRODUCTION TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 1-2 (Supp. 1980) (describing in-
creased frequency of enactment of legislative veto provisions); Abourezk, The Congressional Veto: A
Contemporary Response to Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52 IND. L.J. 323
(1977).
16. See, e.g., H.R. 2, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (proposing general sunset law); S. 2, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S64 (1979) (same); S. REP. No. 981, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978);
Adams, Sunset: A Proposal for Accountable Government, 28 AD. L. REV. 511 (1976).
17. SeeS. 1545, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S9898 (1979); Cutler & Johnson, Regula-
tion and the Political Process, 84 YALE L.J. 1395 (1975).
18. This proposal, commonly referred to as the "Bumpers Amendment" or the "Bumpers Propo-
sal" after its chief proponent, Senator Bumpers, has been introduced into Congress in each of the last
few Congresses. See, e.g., S. 1477, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S12,145 (1979) (floor
amendment offered by Senator Bumpers); S. 86, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 639 (1977).
19. Substantial doubt exists as to the constitutionality of the legislative veto. See, e.g., President's
Message to Congress on Legislative Vetoes, 14 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1146, 1147 (June 26,
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A second type of proposed reform would restructure the process of
agency rulemaking by requiring agencies to open themselves to public
scrutiny, encourage public participation, and explain the bases of and rea-
soning behind their decisions. Openness and explication, it is contended,
will inhibit irrationality and arbitrariness. 21 Resulting oversight of the
agency's factual and normative determinations by Congress, experts in va-
rious disciplines, and the public2 will facilitate further testing of factual
determinations, and intelligent public debate over value choices, and thus,
perhaps, will diminish public cynicism and distrust of government. 23 In-
creasing participation will create a surrogate political process, thus in-
creasing the legitimacy of agency action.2' Furthermore, by increasing the
information and value perspectives available to the agency, it will mini-
mize the chance of unconscious policy bias.2" When combined with the
requirement of explication, it may help limit conscious agency bias by
permitting agencies to adopt only those policies for which they can give a
reasoned response to objections raised by participants.2
This second type of reform, the imposition of internal management
standards, 27 thus attacks the problems of rule by the so-called "fourth
1978); Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 10; McGowan, supra note 12, at 1132-62; Stewart, Constitu-
tionality of the Legislative Veto, 13 HARV. J. LEGIS. 593 (1976). But see Atkins v. United States, 556
F.2d 1028, 1063 (Ct. CI. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978) (per curiam) (plurality opinion
upholding one-house veto).
Proposals to increase Presidential power to review agency action also raise questions of constitution-
ality. See McGowan, supra note 12, at 1168-71.
20. See, e.g., Bazelon, supra note 10, at 829-30 (discussing impossibility of legislature providing
sufficient check); Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 10 (legislative veto); DeMuth, The White House
Review Programs, REGULATION, Jan.-Feb. 1980, at 13, 25 (Cutler and Johnson proposal); Mc-
Gowan, supra note 12, at 1132-62, 1165-68, 1170-71 (legislative veto, Cutler and Johnson proposal,
and Bumpers Amendment); Stewart, supra note 5, at 1696-97 (non-delegation doctrine).
21. See STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, supra note 10, pt. 3, at 3-5; Bazelon, supra note 10, at
825; Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1292 (1975); Stewart, supra note
5, at 1679-80, 1702.
22. See Bazelon, supra note 10, at 823; Stewart, supra note 5, at 1701.
23. See Bazelon, supra note 10, at 823-25; Gellhorn, Public Participation in Administrative Pro-
ceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359, 361 (1972).
24. See Bazelon, supra note 10, at 829; Gellhorn, supra note 23, at 361; Stewart, supra note 5, at
1670, 1712.
25. Bonfield, Representation for the Poor in Federal Rulemaking, 67 MICH. L. REV. 511, 511-12
(1969); Stewart, supra note 5, at 1686-87, 1713.
26. See sources cited supra note 21.
27. The term "internal management standards" may cover a lot of ground. For example, it would
not be improper to view structural injunctions that have been used in the school and prison contexts as
court-imposed internal management standards. It is therefore important to note that the proposed
reforms constitute a relatively low level of intrusion into agency management. Rather than completely
restructuring an agency's mode of operation, they merely force the agency to be more open and re-
sponsive to participation and scrutiny by outsiders. See pp. 744-52 infra. In contrast, see, for example,
Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), afl'd sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d
283 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978) (holding that conditions of certain prisons
violated prisoners' Eighth Amendment rights and giving detailed instructions to state concerning how
situation was to be rectified); Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972), afl'd in part,
503 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975) (holding same and again giving
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branch" 8 while allowing the broad delegation of authority that is neces-
sary to regulate in areas of factual or normative complexity or uncer-
tainty. Each branch of government has recently recognized the value of
imposing internal management standards and has acted or is seriously
considering acting to impose such standards upon agencies. Despite re-
markable similarity among the actions or proposals of each branch, no
attempt has been made to coordinate their efforts.
A. The Judicial Response
Over the past three decades, courts have struggled to remain within
their sphere of competence and legitimacy, and yet to check and legitimate
the discretion of administrative agencies in promulgating policy. 9 The is-
sue of judicial competence arises because judges often do not have the
training necessary to resolve difficult factual questions or evaluate the le-
gitimacy of inferences from the facts." Furthermore, courts are thought to
lack the democratic legitimacy to supply norms that are missing from an
agency statute."
In the last fifteen years, uneasiness over the increased pervasiveness of
government has led courts and commentators to reexamine the previously
accepted notion that judicial review of agency determinations ought to be
highly deferential." While some decisions of the early 1970's retained the
detailed instructions concerning how to correct the situation); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781
(M.D. Ala. 1971), enforced, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972) and 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala.
1972), modified sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that treatment
of patients involuntarily confined in mental hospital violated patients' constitutional rights and defin-
ing, with great specificity, minimum standards).
28. Charges that agencies are a "headless fourth branch" of the government can be found at least
as far back as 1937. See PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, REPORT
WITH SPECIAL STUDIES 39-40 (1937).
29. See, e.g., American Pub. Gas Ass'n v. Federal Power Comm'n, 567 F.2d 1016, 1063-64 (D.C.
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 907 (1978) (discussing standard of judicial review of rates set by
Federal Power Commission); Stewart, supra note 5, at 1679-81.
30. See International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(Bazelon, C.J., concurring); Bazelon, supra note 10, at 817; Bazelon, Risk and Responsibility, 205
SCIENCE 277, 278 (1979); Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial
Review, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 375, 393 (1974). But see Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444
F.2d 841, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971) (Leventhal, J.) ("A court does not
depart from its proper function when it undertakes a study of the record, hopefully perceptive, even as
to the evidence on technical and specialized matters. .. .") See generally McGarity, Substantive and
Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcino-
gens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L.J. 729 (1979).
31. See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(refusing to overturn basic policy determinations underlying OSHA asbestos dust standard, but re-
manding standard for clarification of reasons for certain determinations); Bazelon, supra note 10, at
822; Stewart, supra note 5, at 1786-87.
32. DeLong, Informal Rulemaking and the Integration of Law and Policy, 65 VA. L. REV. 257,
261 (1979); see Wright, supra note 14, at 579. The criticisms of government came from the entire
political spectrum. See Wright, supra note 14, at 579.
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highly deferential standard of review,33 other courts have constrained
agency discretion by reading vague statutory authority narrowly. 4 Some
judges and commentators have urged the elimination of broad discretion
through revival of the non-delegation doctrine.3" Other courts and com-
mentators seem to believe that vigorous substantive review that immerses
the court in all data presented to it is the solution to agency discretion.3
By contrast, over the past decade many courts, led by the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia, have chosen a weak form of structural
review of the agency's rulemaking process as the primary means of check-
ing agency discretion. 7
This form of review is designed to constrain agency discretion while
recognizing the limits of judicial competence and legitimacy. 8 It focuses
on the rule-making process and defers to agency determinations of fact
and law when either or both are unclear.3 9 Instead of a strict substantive
33. See, e.g., Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973) (per curiam) (upholding denial of bank charter
despite minimal and conclusory explanation of rule); United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp.,
406 U.S. 742, 748-49 (1972) (employing, in upholding rule promulgated by ICC, highly deferential
standard of review stated in Assigned Car Cases, 274 U.S. 564 (1927)); Angel v. Butz, 487 F.2d 260,
262-63 (10th Cir. 1973) (allowing Secretary of Agriculture to rely upon "expertise" and material
outside of the record in determining fair and reasonable wages for sugar workers).
34. See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 639-
46 (1980) (plurality opinion reading unclear Occupational Safety and Health statute to require find-
ing of "significant" benefits from a standard issued pursuant thereto, prior to its issuance).
35. See supra note 14.
36. See, e.g., Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 905 (1976)
(basing decision upholding EPA disapproval of state implementation plan on detailed independent
review of entire record); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974) (remanding stationary source standard for procedural reasons but only
after extensive examination of correctness of various substantive determinations made by EPA).
37. See DeLong, supra note 32, at 259, 262; McGowan, supra note 12, at 1167; Rodgers, A Hard
Look At Vermont Yankee: Environmental Law Under Close Scrutiny, 67 GEO. L.J. 699, 704-08
(1975); Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REV. 185, 207-08 (1974).
Though internal management review has developed primarily in the last fifteen years, its doctrinal
origins can be traced further back. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
38. Indeed, the legitimacy and competence problems suggest that the only effective and legitimate
tool that the courts have left is review of agency internal management. See DeLong, supra note 32, at
282-309.
39. See, e.g., American Pub. Gas Ass'n v. Federal Power Comm'n, 567 F.2d 1016, 1063 (D.C.
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 907 (1978) (upholding Federal Power Commission gas rate order
on basis that commission had employed "reasoned decisionmaking and fair procedure" and had re-
sponded to objections in promulgating orders); Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 548 F.2d 998
(D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 925 (1977) (upholding various substantive determinations of
EPA concerning suspension of registrations of several pesticides but striking down exemption of ex-
isting stocks of pesticides for failure to inquire into amount of such stocks left and problem of re-
turning and disposing of them); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
941 (1976) (en banc) (upholding EPA order requiring reductions in lead content of gasoline); Indus-
trial Union Dep't., AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding that great defer-
ence should be accorded determinations when information is lacking or unclear, but remanding for
failure to explain certain determinations); Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463
F.2d 783, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (dictum) (in reviewing environmental impact statements,
court is not to rule on relative "merits of competing scientific opinions but only to ensure that statement
sets forth opposing scientific views).
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review, it seeks to ensure that the agency's rule-making process is "openly
informed, reasoned, and candid."40
In an effort to ensure opportunities for meaningful public participation,
the courts that have adopted this form of review have required timely
notice that discloses the bases of a proposed rule.' Demanding that the
agency take a "hard look" at all the relevant factors,4 these courts have
required coherent written demonstration43 that serious issues raised by
participants in the rulemaking process were considered and evaluated."
Indeed, in some instances courts have required discussion of issues that
were not raised by participants." Though internal management review is
deferential toward agency factual and policy determinations, it demands
that the agency explain such determinations." Furthermore, it sometimes
40. Wright, supra note 30, at 379; see DeLong, supra note 32, at 265-72; Rogers, supra note 37,
at 704-07.
41. See, e.g., Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp. v. CPSC, 569 F.2d 831, 842 (5th Cir. 1978) (setting
aside safety standard for swimming pools for failure to give meaningful opportunity for public com-
ment); United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding FDA's
failure to disclose scientific basis for proposed regulation concerning smoked whitefish was reversible
error); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
921 (1974) (remanding stationary source standard for cement plants for reasons including failure of
EPA to disclose test results that were basis for proposed regulation).
42. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971) (reversing
lower courts' holdings allowing Secretary of Department of Transportation to authorize use of federal
funds to construct highway through a public park and remanding to lower court for in-depth scrutiny
of Secretary's decision); Asarco v. EPA, 616 F.2d 1153, 1161-62 (9th Cir. 1980) (vacating EPA order
requiring installation of a sampling station in smokestack at copper smelter, because of inadequate
consideration of relevant factors); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394-95 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974) (remanding stationary source standard for reasons in-
cluding inadequate consideration of relevant factors).
43. See, e.g., Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp. v. CPSC, 569 F.2d 831, 837-38 (5th Cir. 1978) (dictum)
(holding that substantial evidence did not support safety standard of swimming pool slides); Texas v.
EPA, 499 F.2d 289, 297 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 905 (1976) (dictum) (in part uphold-
ing legality of EPA determination that Texas' air quality implementation plan was inadequate); see
also Wright, New Judicial Requisites for Informal Rulemaking: Implications for the Environmental
Impact Statement Process, 29 AD. L. REV. 59 (1977) (suggesting that courts should and will summa-
rily vacate agency action when record kept by agency is confused or otherwise inadequate).
44. E.g., Bunker Hill Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1286, 1299-1301 (9th Cir. 1977) (remanding rejec-
tion of state implementation plan, in part due to failure to respond to criticism of key factual assump-
tion); American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 568 F.2d 284, 299 (3d Cir. 1977) (holding that EPA must
respond to contention that age of steel plant affects plants' pollution control costs); Portland Cement
Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 392-93 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974)
(remanding stationary source standard for reasons including failure to respond to challenge to accu-
racy of test data relied upon).
45. See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm'n. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1119 (D.C. Cir.
1971) (holding that AEC must consider environmental values not raised by parties or staff); Scenic
Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 620 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
941 (1966) (remanding FPC order granting license to construct hydroelectric project, in part due to
FPC failure to inquire beyond record). But see Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 551-54 (1978) (suggesting that agency need not ferret out
alternatives unless a party makes a showing that is "sufficient to require reasonable minds to inquire
further").
46. American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 568 F.2d 284, 310 (3d Cir. 1977) (requiring EPA to
explain and support determination that certain cooling devices would not cause evaporation of water);
Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155, 1160 (3d Cir.) (dictum), cert.
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requires that the agency explain any inconsistency with previous
determinations.47
Courts have developed these internal management standards on a case-
by-case basis. Though many courts seem to agree that internal manage-
ment requirements must be imposed, there is little agreement on which
requirements should be imposed and under what circumstances."
B. The Executive Branch Response
Executive branch attempts to constrain agency discretion began with
President Ford's Executive Order 11,821 49 requiring executive branch
agencies to prepare an "inflation impact statement" (IIS) 0 for each "ma-
jor"5' federal action. Each IIS was to contain a written analysis of the
denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1974); Dry Color Mfrs. Ass'n v. Department of Labor, 486 F.2d 98, 106-07
(3d Cir. 1973) (vacating emergency standards for suspected carcinogens for failure to explain basis for
suspicion and choice of standard); Citizens Ass'n of Georgetown v. Zoning Comm'n, 477 F.2d 402
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (requiring zoning commission to explain failure to "downzone" waterfront area).
47. See American Meat Inst. v. EPA., 526 F.2d 442, 459-60 (7th Cir. 1975) (striking down EPA
TSS limitation for complex slaughterhouses because of EPA failure to explain deviation from normal
practice of relying upon questionnaire data).
48. 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6:1, at 450 (1978); DeLong, supra note 32, at
283, 290-307; Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 258,
288-89 (1978); Verkuil, supra note 37, at 244.
Judicial opinions concerning the issue of the importance of giving notice are an example of the
disagreement that exists concerning the when and what of imposing internal management require-
ments. Compare Yassini v. Crosland, 618 F.2d 1356, 1360 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (exempting
Immigration and Naturalization Service from notice requirement of Administrative Procedure Act
despite absence of required express finding of "good cause") and United States Steel Corp. v. EPA,
605 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035 (1980) (exempting EPA from notice and
good cause requirements in designating areas that do not meet air quality standards) with Sharon
Steel Corp. v. EPA, 597 F.2d 377 (3d Cir. 1979) (finding no good cause for EPA failure to give
notice concerning rule designating areas not in compliance with ambient air quality standards, and
remanding rule) and United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1979) (same). Even
assuming notice must be given, a disagreement exists concerning whether or not an agency that relied
on empirical data in determining that a rule might be necessary must disclose that methodology in its
notice of proposed rulemaking. Compare Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 82-94 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976) (en bane) (upholding EPA order requiring reductions in lead content in
gasoline despite failure to disclose scientific studies relied upon) with cases cited supra note 41.
49. 3 C.F.R. 203 (1975), reprinted in 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (1976) (expiration date extended and
name changed by Exec. Order No. 11,949, 3 C.F.R. 161 (1977)) [hereinafter reference to U.S.C. will
be omitted].
50. It was later realized that the term "inflation impact statement" reflects poorly the nature of
the required analysis; when the Order was extended in 1976, the analysis was called an "economic
impact statement." Exec. Order No. 11,949, 3 C.F.R. 161 (1977).
51. Originally agencies were left to develop their own criteria for determining what was a "ma-
jor" proposal, though the criteria developed had to be submitted to OMB for approval. Office of
Management and Budget, Circular No. A-107 (Jan. 28, 1975). Eventually the Council on Wage and
Price Stability adopted a list of suggested criteria, which essentially defined "major" as entailing a cost
of $100 million or more in one year, or $150 million or more in two years. See STAFF OF THE
COUNCIL ON WAGE AND PRICE STABILITY & THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, AN EVAL-
UATION OF THE INFLATION IMPACT STATEMENT PROGRAM PREPARED FOR THE ECONOMIC POLICY
BOARD 15 (1976); Note, The Inflation Impact Statement Program: An Assessment of the First Two
Years, 26 AM. U.L. REV. 1138, 1150 n.79 (1977). The criteria were adopted in large part by all
covered agencies. Id.
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expected costs and benefits of proposed federal action and a review of the
alternatives that were considered.12 Though increased public participation
in the regulatory process was also considered an essential element of the
program, the only step taken to increase participation was to require pub-
lication of the IIS.
5 3
President Carter's Executive Order 12,044 implemented an internal
management program that was both broader and more detailed than the
IIS program. 4 It required agencies to prepare a draft "regulatory analy-
sis" before issuing public notice of proposed "major"55 rules, and to pub-
lish a final regulatory analysis concurrent with the issuance of such
rules. 6 Both analyses were required to give "a succinct statement of the
problem; a description of the major alternative ways of dealing with the
problem that were considered by the agency; an analysis of the economic
consequences of each of these alternatives and a detailed explanation of
the reasons for choosing one alternative over the others. 5s7 In addition,
Executive Order 12,044 sought to increase opportunities for meaningful
public participation and scrutiny by requiring agencies to consider a vari-
ety of methods for giving more effective notice of proposed regulations,58
by increasing the time for public comment to sixty days where possible,"
and by making both the draft and final regulatory analyses easily availa-
ble to the public.6 0
President Reagan's Executive Order 12,291 '61 though superseding Ex-
52. See Office of Management and Budget, Circular No. A-107 § 4(b) (Jan. 28, 1975) (imple-
menting Exec. Order No. 11,821).
53. See Note, supra note 51, at 1163.
54. 3 C.F.R. 152 (1979), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 553 (Supp. III 1979) [hereinafter reference to
U.S.C. will be omitted].
55. The definition of a major rule was similar to the definition under Ford's Executive Order:
[R]egulatory analyses [must be] performed for all regulations which will result in (a) an an-
nual effect on the economy of $100 million or more; or (b) a major increase in costs or prices
for individual industries, levels of government or geographic regions.
Exec. Order No. 12,044 § 3(a)(1), 3 C.F.R. 152, 154 (1979).
56. Id. § 3(b)(2)-(3), 3 C.F.R. at 155.
57. Id. § 3(b)(1), 3 C.F.R. at 154.
58. Agencies were required to publish "at least semi-annually an agenda of significant regulations
under development and review . . . [describing, at a minimum] the regulations being considered by
the agency, the need for and the legal basis for the action being taken, and the status of regulations
previously listed on the agenda." Id. § 2 (a), 3 C.F.R. at 153. In addition, agencies were to "consider"
a variety of ways to "give the public an early and meaningful opportunity to participate in the devel-
opment of agency regulations. . . including (1) publishing an advance notice of proposed rulemaking;
(2) holding open conferences or public hearings; (3) sending notices of proposed regulations to publi-
cations likely to be read by those affected; and (4) notifying interested parties directly." Id. § 2(c), 3
C.F.R. at 153.
59. A brief explanation was required of any determination by the agency that the 60 day period
was not possible. Id. § 2(c), 3 C.F.R. at 153. The Executive Order suggests that the number of
instances in which the sixty day period is not possible ought to be "few." Id.
60. Id. § 3(b)(2)-(3), 3 C.F.R. at 155.
61. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 601 (West
Supp. 1982) [hereinafter reference to U.S.C.A. will be omitted].
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ecutive Order 12,044,62 retains many of its essential features. It requires
agencies to peform, for "major""3 rules, preliminary and final "Regulatory
Impact Analyses" (RIAs) that contain descriptions of the potential costs
and benefits of a rule, including its nonquantifiable effects, and a determi-
nation of the rule's potential net benefits." RIAs must also describe any
alternative approaches that could be more cost effective than the approach
chosen, and explain the legal reasons for rejection of the most cost-effec-
tive approach." Like its predecessors, President Reagan's Order seeks to
assure meaningful public participation in the regulatory process. In addi-
tion to making the RIAs available to the public," it requires the agency to
include with its notice of proposed rulemaking "a brief statement setting
forth the agency's initial determination whether the proposed rule is a
major rule, together with the reasons underlying that determination,"' 7
and a "brief summary of the agency's preliminary Regulatory Impact
Analysis.""6 The agency is further ordered to pay "full attention to public
comments in general and the comments of persons directly affected by the
rule in particular"'9 in assessing the validity of the factual conclusions
upon which the rule is based.
Thus, not only the judiciary but each of the last three Presidents has
imposed constraints on the rulemaking process to ensure that it is "openly
informed, reasoned and candid."" The Executive Orders may not, how-
ever, be motivated solely by the desire to improve the efficacy and legiti-
macy of agency action.7" In addition, the Executive may view them as
means to further its own policy goals by increasing the accountability to
62. Id. § 10, 46 Fed. Reg. at 13,198.
63. The term "major" is defined similarly to the definition in Executive Order 12,044:
"Major rule" means any regulation that is likely to result in:
(1) An annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more;
(2) A major increase in costs or prices for consumers, individual industries, Federal, State,
or local government agencies, or geographic regions; or
(3) Significant adverse effects on competition, employment, investment, productivity, innova-
tion, or on the ability of United States-based enterprises to compete with foreign-based enter-
prises in domestic or export markets.
Id. § l(b), 46 Fed. Reg. at 13,193-94.
64. Id. § 3(d), 46 Fed. Reg. at 13,194.
65. Id.
66. Id. § 3(h), 46 Fed. Reg. at 13,195.
67. Id. § 3(g)(1), 46 Fed. Reg. at 13,195.
68. Id. § 3(g)(2), 46 Fed. Reg. at 13,195.
69. Id. § 4(b), 46 Fed. Reg. at 13,195.
70. See supra note 40.
71. Improving the administrative rulemaking process through internal management standards is,
however, one motive behind the executive actions. See, e.g., R. REAGAN, AMERICA'S NEW BEGINNING:
A PROGRAM FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY (1981), excerpts of which are reprinted in EXECUTIVE OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT, MATERIALS ON PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PROGRAM OF REGULATORY RELIEF 55-57
[hereinafter cited as MATERIALS]. See generally Neudstadt, The Administration's Regulatory Reform
Program: An Overview, 32 AD. L. REV. 129, 137-145 (1979) (discussing President Carter's
program).
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its offices of administrative agencies."
C. The Congressional Response
During the 96th Congress eight bills were introduced that basically re-
iterated the requirements of Executive Order 12,044 and extended it to
agencies outside the executive branch." Two of the bills received substan-
tial attention. 74 During the 97th Congress eight similar bills7 have been
72. President Reagan's Executive Order enhances the ability of the President to control agency
policy through selective enforcement of the requirements, going beyond its predecessors in two signifi-
cant respects. First, it gives OMB vast oversight authority. See infra pp. 754-55. Second, it creates a
substantive requirement that, to the extent permitted by law, agencies not undertake any regulatory
action unless the action's benefits exceed its costs by more than any alternative approach:
In promulgating new regulations, reviewing existing regulations, and developing legislative
proposals concerning regulation, all agencies, to the extent permitted by law, shall adhere to
the following requirements:
(a) Administrative decisions shall be based on adequate information concerning the need for
and consequences of proposed government actions;
(b) Regulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to society from
the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society;
(c) Regulatory objectives shall be chosen to maximize the net benefits to society;
(d) Among alternative approaches to any given regulatory objective, the alternative involving
the least net cost to society shall be chosen; and
(e) Agencies shall set regulatory priorities with the aim of maximizing the aggregate net
benefits to society, taking into account the condition of the particular industries affected by
regulations, the condition of the national economy, and other regulatory actions contemplated
for the future.
Id. § 2.
This substantive prescription raises serious questions of constitutionality and legality. See M. RO-
SENBERG, PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL OF AGENCY RULEMAKING: AN ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL IS-
SUES THAT MAY BE RAISED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER 12291 (1981); infra p. 755.
73. S. 262, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S861 (1979); H.R. 3263, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979); S. 1291, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S7128 (1979); H.R. 75, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979); S. 93, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S287 (1979); H.R. 4233, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979) (identical to S. 262); S. 755, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S3339 (1979) (identical to
H.R. 3263); S. 2147, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S19,040 (1979).
74. H.R. 3263, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) went through hearings, see Regulation Reform Act of
1979: Hearings on H.R. 3263 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Rela-
tions of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), was forwarded to the full
committee, marked up, and on September 25, 1980, was placed on the Union Calendar. Hereinafter
all references to H.R. 3263 will be to the bill's final version, reprinted in H. R. REP. NO. 1393, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1980). The Senate Governmental Affairs Committee held hearings on S. 755,
96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S3339 (1979), which was identical to H.R. 3263, on S. 262,
96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. S861 (1979), and on other regulatory reform legislation, see
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Government Affairs on S. 262, S. 755, S. 445, S. 93 and Other
Regulatory Reform Legislation, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
The Governmental Affairs Committee referred both S. 755 and S. 262 to the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee, which held hearings on them jointly with its Administrative Practice Subcommittee. See Regu-
latory Reform: Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). S 262
was reported to the Senate and assigned number 850 on the Senate Legislative Calendar on May 29,
1980. Hereinafter all references to S. 262 will be to the version reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra,
pt. 2, at 668.
75. See H.R. 1, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 300, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 700,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 746, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 3339, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981); S. 401, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); S. 405, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); S. 1080, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S4231 (1981).
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introduced, and rapid action has been taken on two of them.76 This Note
will concentrate its discussion on four bills, the two in each Congress that
have received the most attention.
The constraints placed on agencies by all four bills are similar both to
each other and to the Executive Orders. The bills require agencies to issue
a preliminary regulatory analysis" concurrent with notice of a proposed
major rule.78 The essential elements of this preliminary regulatory analy-
76. S. 1080, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S4231 (1981), was introduced on April 30,
1981, by Senator Laxalt and his co-sponsors, and was referred jointly to the Committees on the
Judiciary and Governmental Affairs. The Judiciary Committee held hearings, amended the bill and
unanimously reported out an amended copy on July 17, 1981. On September 18, 1981, the Govern-
mental Affairs Committee reported out an amended copy of the bill that sliffered from the Judiciary
Committee's version. On November 30, 1981, Senators Laxalt, Leahy, Roth, and Eagleton proposed a
"consensus substitute for S. 1080," which was subsequently placed on the Senate Calendar for a vote.
The consensus substitute passed the Senate with only minor relevant changes by a 94-0 vote on
March 24, 1982. See 128 Cong. Rca S 2693-2722. Hereinafter all references to S. 1080 will be to the
"consensus substitute," amendment number 640, Number 274 on the Senate Calendar.
H.R. 746, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), was introduced by Mr. Danielson on January 6, 1981, and
referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary, which requested comments from various federal
agencies, and referred the bill to its Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Rela-
tions. The Subcommittee held hearings between April 2, 1981, and May 19, 1981, and held mark-up
sessions in July, 1981. Hereinafter all references to H.R. 746 will be to the amended version dated
July 30, 1981.
77. The term "preliminary regulatory analysis" is used by two of the four bills. See S. 1080,
supra note 76, § 4(a) (proposed § 622(c)); H.R. 3263, supra note 74, § 101(a) (proposed § 602(b)). S.
262, supra note 74, § 102 (proposed § 602), refers to similar requirements as an "initial regulatory
analysis," while H.R. 746, supra note 76, § 101(b) (proposed § 622) simply calls the requirements
"[aidditional procedures for major rules." Hereinafter all such requirements will be referred to as
"preliminary regulatory analysis" requirements.
78. All four bills define "major rule" similarly, though they differ somewhat in which costs they
emphasize. S. 1080 states:
The term "major rule" means-
(A) a rule or a group of closely related rules that. . . is likely to have an annual effect on
the economy of $100,000,000 or more in reasonably quantifiable direct or indirect enforcement
and compliance costs; and
(B) a rule or a group of closely related rules that is . . . likely to result in -
(i) a substantial increase in costs or prices for wage earners, consumers, individual indus-
tries, nonprofit organizations, Federal, State or local government agencies, or geographic re-
gions; or
(ii) significant adverse effects on competition, employment, investment, productivity, innova-
tion, the environment, public health or safety, or the ability of enterprises whose principal
places of business are in the United States to compete in domestic or export markets.
S. 1080, supra note 76, § 4(a) (proposed § 621(4)). The definition of a major rule in H.R. 746 is the
same, except that it does not contain a provision akin to B(ii) and does not refer to the effect of the
rule on domestic businesses. See H.R. 746, supra note 76, § 101(b) (proposed § 621(3)). S. 262
defines a major rule as a rule that is "likely to result in an effect on the economy in any one year of
$100,000,000 or more. . . or is likely to have an equally significant effect." S. 262, supra note 74, §
102 (proposed § 601(3)). H.R. 3263 begins with S. 262's definition and includes, as well, rules that
will "cause a substantial change in costs or prices for individual industries, geographic regions, or
levels of government." H.R. 3263, supra note 74, § 101(a) (proposed § 601(3)). It urges in addition
that special attention be paid to the impact on "small business and small organizations." Id.
An important issue related to the definition of "major rule" is who decides whether a rule falls
within the definition. The bills of the 96th Congress, following the example of Executive Order
12,044, leave the decision to the agency. The bills of the 97th Congress, following the example of
Executive Order 12,291, allow the President, or a designee of his choice within the Executive Office of
the President, to reverse an agency determination that a rule is not major. See S. 1080, supra note 76,
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sis" are: a statement of the need for and objectives of the rule;"0 a descrip-
tion of alternatives to the rule, including the least costly alternative;8' an
assessment of the effects of the rule on the country as a whole and on
particular subgroups; 2  and a description of agency methodology for
resolving factual disputes.8 3 The bills also attempt to improve participa-
tion by making the preliminary regulatory analysis available to the pub-
lic,84 by mandating the creation of a regulatory agenda and calendar," and
by increasing the opportunity for public comment.8 6 Like the Executive
Orders that they would supersede, the bills require the agency to issue a
final regulatory analysis when it issues a major rule. The requirements of
the final regulatory analysis parallel those of the preliminary regulatory
analysis.8 7
§ 4(a) (proposed § 621(4)); H.R. 746, supra note 76, at § 101(a) (proposed § 621(3)(c)).
79. Several bills contain requirements of the preliminary and final regulatory analyses in addition
to the requirements mentioned in the text. Three bills require discussion of the relative advantages
and disadvantages of performance standards as opposed to design standards. H.R. 746, supra note 76,
§ 101(b) (proposed § 622(b)(5)); H.R. 3263, supra note 74, § 101(a) (proposed § 602(b)(6)); S. 1080,
supra note 76, § 4(a) (proposed § 622(c)(2)(C)(iii)). S. 1080 also requires the agency to find that the
benefits "justify" the costs, unless the agency's enabling statute directs otherwise. Id. § 4(a) (proposed
§ 622(d)(2)(B)). H.R. 3263 requires the agency to estimate "the effect of the proposed rule on small
businesses, small organizations, small governmental jurisdictions, and competition in interstate and
foreign commerce." H.R. 3263, supra note 74, § 101(a) (proposed § 602(b)(5)).
80. H.R. 746, supra note 76, § 101(b) (proposed § 622(b)(1)), S. 1080, supra note 76, § 3 (pro-
posed § 553(b)(1)(B)); H.R. 3263, supra note 74, § 101(a) (proposed § 602(b)(1)); S. 262, supra note
74, at § 102 (proposed § 602(b)(1), (2)).
81. H.R. 746, supra note 76, § 101(b) (proposed § 622(b)(2)). See S. 1080, supra note 76, § 4(a)
(proposed § 622(c)(2)(O)); S. 262, supra note 74, § 102 (proposed § 602(b)(3), (4)); H.R. 3263, supra
note 74, § 101(a) (proposed § 602(b)(2) and (4)).
82. S. 1080, supra note 76, § 4(a) (proposed § 622(c)(2)(A)-(B)); H.R. 746, supra note 76, §
101(b) (proposed § 622 (b)(3)); H.R. 3263, supra note 74, § 101(a) (proposed § 602(b)(3), (5)). Cf
S. 262, supra note 74, § 102 (proposed § 602(b)) (not mentioning any specific subgroups).
83. H.R. 746, supra note 76, § 101(b) (proposed § 622(b)(6)). Cf S. 1080, supra note 76, §§ 3,
4(a) (proposed §§ 553(b)(1)(F), 622(c)(2)(D)) (including, as well, requirement that agencies specify
ranges of predictions and explain margins of errors for quantification method when relevant). H.R.
3263 and S. 262 contain no provision similar to this one.
84. S. 1080, supra note 76, § 3 (proposed § 553(O(1)(E)); H.R. 746, supra note 76, § 101(b)
(proposed § 622(e)(2)); H (proposed § 602(e)(2)); see also S. 262, supra note 74, § 102 (proposed §
602(c)) (requiring publication of the preliminary' regulatory analysis in Federal Register and requir-
ing agency to take additional unspecified steps to "ensure that interested members of the public receive
notice of the initial regulatory analysis").
85. S. 1080, supra note 76, § 4(a) (proposed § 632); H.R. 746, supra note 76, § 101(b) (proposed
§§ 631-632); S. 262, supra note 74, § 102 (proposed § 622); H.R. 3263, supra note 74, § 101(a)
(proposed §§ 621-622).
86. The bills demand that interested persons be given at least sixty days to comment on the pro-
posed rulemaking. See S. 1080, supra note 76, § 3 (proposed § 553(c)(1)); H.R. 746, supra note 76, §
101(b) (proposed § 622(g)); S. 262, supra note 74, § 102 (proposed § 602(c)); H.R. 3263, supra note
74, § 101(a) (proposed § 602(c)). H.R. 3263 also provides for twenty days to comment on the public
comments received during the sixty day period. Id. S. 1080 also requires that the agency provide an
opportunity for oral presentation of views and cross-examination of agency employees. S. 1080, supra
note 76, § 3 (proposed § 553(c)(3)(A)).
87. See S. 1080, supra note 76, § 4(a) (proposed § 622(d) and (e)); H.R. 746, supra note 76, §
101(b) (proposed § 622(c)); S. 262, supra note 74, § 102 (proposed § 603(b)); H.R. 3263, supra note
74, § 101(a) (proposed § 602(d)).
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Each branch of the federal government has sought to impose upon the
agencies remarkably similar internal management requirements. The at-
tempts are similar because each is based on three major precepts. First,
they presume that agency decisionmaking will be improved by ensuring
that agencies explore fully the consequences of major regulatory actions
and examine alternative means of accomplishing the agency objectives."'
Second, they presume that it is desirable to force the agency to weigh costs
and benefits explicitly. Third, they presume that it is valuable to en-
courage input into and public scrutiny of the weighing process." In short,
the proposals are similar because each is a reflection of the belief that
better and more legitimate agency decisionmaking will result from a pro-
cess that is "openly informed, reasoned and candid." 9
II. The Failure to Enforce Internal Management Standards
Neither the executive nor the judicial attempts to impose an internal
management model upon agencies have been successful. Because they fail
to ensure agency compliance with their requirements, 92 legislative at-
tempts formulated during the 96th and 97th Congresses are not likely to
be more successful.
A. The Judiciary
The existence of the Executive Orders and legislative proposals is testi-
mony to the failure of the courts to impose adequate internal management
standards upon the agencies. Judicial imposition of internal management
standards faces two major obstacles. First, the legal basis for internal
management review is unclear.93 As one commentator has noted, although
at least seven different bases have been cited, none are convincing. Fur-
88. See H.R. REP. No. 1393, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1980) (to accompany H.R. 3263); S. REP.
No. 1018, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 29 (1980) (to accompany S. 262); Neustadt, supra note 71, at
140; cases cited supra notes 42, 44-46.
89. H.R. REP. No. 1393, supra note 88, at 39-40; S. REP. No. 1018, supra note 88, at 29;
Neustadt, supra note 71, at 140; cases cited supra notes 43, 45, 46.
90. See Senate Hearings, supra note 74, pt. 1, at 204 (statement of Charles L. Schultze, Chair-
man, Council of Economic Advisors); S. REP. NO. 1018, supra note 88, at 29; H.R. REP. No. 1393,
supra note 88, at 20; cases cited supra note 41.
91. See supra note 40.
92. Absent an enforcement mechanism, agencies are unlikely to perform tasks that they consider
onerous. See Fleming v. Moberly Milk Prods. Co., 160 F.2d 259, 264-65 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed,
331 U.S. 786 (1947); Wright, supra note 14, at 578, 580. It is interesting to note, however, that
agency resistance to the internal management requirements may be based on a misperception of self-
interest. See infra pp. 760-62.
93. See DeLong, supra note 32, at 272-73. As Professor Black has noted in another context, "[t]he
mere existence of a real and substantial doubt as to the legitimacy of a government must surely
enfeeble it . . . ." C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 36 (1960).
94. DeLong, supra note 32, at 272-76.
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thermore, most opinions are very vague about their source of authority,
and those that do cite a source do not consistently associate particular re-
quirements with a particular justification." The legitimacy of judicially
imposed internal mangement standards thus remains open to question.
Second, the specific contours of internal management review remain un-
clear.96 With no guidelines for which requirements should be imposed,
courts adhering to internal management review have experimented to an
extraordinary degree.97
Given the substantiality of the shift in reviewing posture, the absence of
a firm legal basis for that shift, and the lack of agreement on the specific
elements of the new form of review, it is not surprising that judicial efforts
have failed to yield a uniform and consistently enforced set of principles.
Nevertheless, this failure leaves the courts in a difficult position vis-a-vis
the agencies. Lacking a coherent model to apply and somewhat hesitant,
because of the questions of legitimacy, the judiciary is incapable of apply-
ing an internal management model with sufficient consistency and clarity
to check adequately agency discretion.98
B. The Executive Branch
The executive branch has relied solely on itself to supervise the internal
mangement requirements. President Ford's "inflation impact statement"
requirement was supervised by the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) and the Council on Wage and Price Stability (COWPS)." Presi-
dent Carter's regulatory analysis requirement was supervised by OMB,
COWPS, and the Regulatory Analysis Review Group (RARG).100 Presi-
95. Id.
96. See supra pp. 745-46.
97. See K. DAVIS, supra note 48, § 6:1, at 450; DeLong supra note 32, at 283, 290-307; Verkuil,
supra note 48, at 288-89; Verkuil, supra note 37, at 244.
98. It is possible that the passage of time will lessen legitimacy questions and allow courts to
agree on a particular model. The magnitude of current problems, however, suggests that the amount
of time necessary will be substantial. Furthermore, the Supreme Court's recent denunciation, in Ver-
mont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. National Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978), of
judicial communication concerning the exact elements of the internal management model is likely to
further inhibit judicial movement toward consensus.
99. See Exec. Order No. 11,821, § 2, 3 C.F.R. 203 (1975).
100. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) was charged with "assur[ing] the effective
implementation of [the Executive] Order." See Exec. Order No. 12,044, § 5, 3 C.F.R. 152, 155-56
(1979). OMB, in turn, delegated this authority to the Council on Wage and Price Stability
(COWPS), the Regulatory Analysis Review Group (RARG), and the Council of Economic Advisors
(CEA). See M. ROSENBERG, supra note 72, at 11; DeMuth, supra note 20, at 16. RARG is an
interagency review group, staffed with or advised by people from OMB, CEA, the Environmental
Protection Agency, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Council on Environmental Quali-
ty, the Domestic Policy Staff, and every cabinet department except Defense, State, and Treasury, see
DeMuth, supra note 20 at 16; Tolchin, Presidential Power and the Politics of RARG, REGULATION,
July-Aug. 1979, at 44, 44-45, though the major forces are COWPS and the CEA. DeMuth, supra
note 20, at 16; Tolchin, supra, at 45.
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dent Reagan's Order relies upon OMB for enforcement.'"' Each of the
Executive Orders precludes judicial review of compliance.10 2
History suggests that reliance upon executive branch supervision is mis-
placed; the executive branch, by itself, seems unable to enforce the re-
quirements. In 1976, a review by OMB and COWPS of compliance with
the inflation impact statement (IIS) requirement concluded that "few IIS's
were actually prepared, and those by only a small number of agencies."103
Four years later, when OMB reviewed compliance with Executive Order
12,044, it concluded that "agencies may be making a 'sham' out of the
regulatory analysis requirement."
'1 4
One possible cause of the failure of executive branch enforcement in the
past was the weakness of the enforcement provisions. Under both Presi-
dent Ford's and President Carter's plans, enforcement efforts were essen-
tially hortatory. President Reagan has made a dramatic attempt to over-
come this problem by giving the OMB extensive enforcement powers,
including the authority to order that a proposed or existing rule or set of
rules be treated as "major," 105 to order that an agency not publish a notice
of proposed rulemaking or its preliminary regulatory impact analysis until
101. See Executive Order No. 12,291, §§ 3, 6, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,194-96 (1981). OMB's
supervision, in turn, is supervised by the Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief, which was
also created by Executive Order No. 12,291. Id. § 6, 46 Fed. Reg. at 13,196. The Task Force is
chaired by Vice-President Bush and includes the Director of OMB, the Secretaries of Treasury, Com-
merce and Labor, the Attorney General, the Chairman of the CEA, and the Assistant to the President
for Policy Development. M. ROSENBERG, supra note 72, at 16. OMB orders may be appealed to the
Task Force, Exec. Order No. 12,291, §§ 3(e)(1), 6(a)(1), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,194, 13,196, but
OMB provides most of the staff support for the Task Force. M. ROSENBERG, supra note 72, at 16.
102. See In re Surface Mining Litig., 627 F.2d 1346, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that re-
quirements of Executive Order 11,821 were not judicially reviewable); Independent Meat Packers
Ass'n v. Butz, 526 F.2d 228, 234-36 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 966 (1976) (same); Exec.
Order No. 12,291, § 9, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,198 (1981); Exec. Order No. 12,044, § 7, 3 C.F.R.
152, 156 (1979). It may be that Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan could not have mandated judi-
cial review even had they wanted to. See Independent Meat Packers Ass'n v. Butz, 526 F.2d 228,
234-36 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 966 (1976). But d. In re Surface Mining Regulation
Litig., 452 F. Supp. 327, 334 (D.D.C. 1978), modified, 627 F.2d 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (mem.
opinion) (implying, in dicta, that court might review compliance with internal rules promulgated by
agency to implement Exec. Order No. 11,821).
103. COUNCIL ON WAGE AND PRICE STABILITY & OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, AN
EVALUATION OF THE INFLATION IMPACT STATEMENT PROGRAM 79 (1976); see UNITED STATES REG-
ULATORY COUNCIL, A SURVEY OF TEN AGENCIES' EXPERIENCE WITH REGULATORY ANALYSIS (1981)
(working paper).
104. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, IMPROVING GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS: A PRO-
GRESS REPORT 18 (1980) [hereinafter cited as OMB REPORT]; see Miller, Lessons of the Economic
Impact Statement Program, REGULATION, July-Aug. 1977, at 14, 16. OMB also found that no agency
had a "departmentwide continuously successful effort in place." OMB REPORT, supra, at 18. It is
interesting to note that this failure occurred despite President Carter's intense interest in the success of
the program. Tolchin, supra note 100, at 45. Indeed, Carter demanded that he be given a progress
report on the program fortnightly. Id.
105. Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 6(a)(1), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,196 (1981). In addition OMB is
to prescribe criteria to guide agency determinations of whether rules are major. Id. §§ 3(b), 6(a)(2),
46 Fed. Reg. at 13,194, 13,196.
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OMB's review of the proposed rule is completed,"0 6 to order that an
agency not publish a final rule or its regulatory impact analysis until the
agency has responded to OMB's view concerning the rule or analysis,
10 7
and to require an agency to obtain and evaluate additional data.'08
The Reagan attempt suffers from several defects, however. First, Rea-
gan's assumption, through the OMB, of authority over agency rulemaking
appears to be illegitimate. The power assumed allows the White House to
exert substantial direct control over agency policy."0 9 This displacement of
the discretion vested by Congress in executive branch agencies may violate
the Administrative Procedure Act, the statutes granting discretion to agen-
cies, and the separation of powers."0 Furthermore, by establishing OMB
as a clearinghouse for all regulations, Executive Order 12,291 encourages
informal contacts between OMB and the agencies and creates a critical
access point to agency decisionmaking."' It thereby creates an environ-
ment that may violate strictures concerning ex parte comments in two
ways: by allowing ex parte comments by the White House,' 2 and by al-
lowing interest groups to influence agency action by communicating
through OMB."'
106. Id. § 3(f(1), 46 Fed. Reg. at 13,195.
107. Id. § 3(f)(2), 46 Fed. Reg. at 13,195. The agency need not obey OMB's order to refrain
from publishing either a notice of proposed rulemaking and preliminary regulatory impact analysis or
a final rule and final regulatory impact analysis if obeying the order would conflict with statutorily or
judicially imposed deadlines. Id. § 8(a)(2), 46 Fed. Reg. at 13,198; cf id. § 8(a)(1), 46 Fed. Reg. at
13,198 (no procedure of Executive Order need be followed for regulation responding to emergency
situation).
108. Id. § 6(a)(3), 46 Fed. Reg. at 13,196.
109. The illegitimacy of Presidential attempts to guide agency policy has been discussed by many
leading judicial figures and commentators. See, e.g., H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES 147-63 (1962); J. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT ELECT
207-09 (1960); Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White House,
80 COLUM. L. REV. 943 (1980).
110. See M. ROSENBERG, supra note 72, at 49-80; Fleishman & Aufses, Law and Orders: The
Problem of Presidential Legislation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1976, at 1; Gewirtz, The
Courts, Congress and Executive Policy-Making: Notes on Three Doctrines, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1976, at 46, 46-80 (1976); Verkuil, supra note 109, at 950; Note, Delegation and
Regulatory Reform: Letting the President Change the Rules, 89 YALE L.J. 561, 577-78 (1980).
111. See M. ROSENBERG, supra note 72, at 48-80; Bruff, Presidential Power and Administrative
Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 451, 466-67 (1979); Tolchin, supra note 100, at 46; Verkuil, supra note
109, at 948-52 (citing R. NEUSTADT, REGULATORY REFORM-THE PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM (1979)).
112. See M. ROSENBERG, supra note 72, at 49-80, 96-111; Bruff, supra note 111, at 466-67. The
scope or, indeed, existence of strictures on ex parte comments by the President is as yet unclear.
Nevertheless, it has been persuasively argued that ex parte contacts such as those that are encouraged
by the Reagan Executive Order would be illegal, as frustrating congressional purposes behind the
Administrative Procedure Act or congressional statutes delegating authority to agencies, and perhaps
unconstitutional, as violative of the separation of powers. See M. ROSENBERG, supra note 72, at 49-80,
96-111; Verkuil, supra note 109, at 949-50. But see Bruff, supra note 111 (agreeing that certain
presidential ex parte comments are illegal or unconstitutional but arguing for a reading of statute and
Constitution that arguably might uphold Executive Order 12,291).
113. M. ROSENBERG, supra note 72, at 49-80, 96-111; Bliss, Regulatory Reform: Toward More
Balanced and Flexible Federal Agency Regulation, 8 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 619, 634, 637-38 (1981);
Bruff, supra note 111, at 466-67; Verkuil, supra note 109, at 950; see also H. FRIENDLY, supra note
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Second, it is not clear that the executive branch is capable of supervis-
ing all regulations for compliance. One problem is personnel shortages.
Even under the previous Executive Orders staff levels were inadequate; 14
under President Reagan's Order the staff has been cut" 5 and the responsi-
bilities increased.1 6 Moreover, there are political problems inherent in ex-
ecutive branch self-review. The White House operates in a highly politi-
cal and public arena.1 Because its actions are often viewed as motivated
by policy or political concerns," 8 substantial political pressure is exerted
prior to White House actions, and substantial criticisms leveled subse-
quently. 9 Because presidential actions are so public, the pressures and
criticism are most severe when the President intervenes directly.2 0 The
lack of insulation from, indeed, the immersion in, political pressures and
criticism makes it likely that the White House also will view its actions in
political terms, in terms of how they fit with its major policy objectives or
political goals.' The White House will thus tend to stress the political
uses of internal mangement requirements rather than their use in ensur-
ing that agency action is "openly informed, reasoned and candid."
There are additional tendencies for executive branch self-review to be-
come politicized. Agencies that are displeased with OMB review may seek
to bring pressure upon OMB to change its actions, either by politicking
within the executive branch or by appealing to political supporters outside
the executive branch.122 The latter course obviously further politicizes the
process of review. The former course also has a tendency to politicize, by
necessitating presidential intervention to put an end to intrigue and fight-
ing within the executive branch.
Thus, even setting aside the legal and constitutional concerns over the
109, at 153-57 (suggesting that presidency is unlikely to be able to withstand political pressures).
114. See Note, supra note 51, at 1151 (discussing shortage of personnel reviewing President
Ford's program); df. Regulatory Action Network: Washington Watch, Sept. 1981, at S-1, col. 1 (dis-
cussing inadequacies of current staff).
115. Washington Post, May 4, 1981, § A, at 1, col. 4.
116. See Regulatory Action Network: Washington Watch, Sept. 1981, at S-1, col. 1; supra pp.
754-55.
117. See H. FRIENDLY, supra note 109, at 153-54; Bliss, supra note 113, at 634; DeMuth, supra
note 20, at 25; Tolchin, supra note 100, at 49.
118. See Bliss, supra note 113, at 634, 637; Eads, Harnessing Regulation, REGULATION, May-
June 1981, at 19 (suggesting that enforcement of Exec. Order 12,291 will be determined by political
concerns); Tolchin, supra note 100, at 49; N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1981, at 28, col. 4 (quoting Rep.
Henry A. Waxman's statement that Exec. Order 12,291 will be used as a "political tool rather than
as a regulatory tool"); Washington Post, May 4, 1981, § A, at 5, col. 1 (suggesting same).
119. See DeMuth, supra note 20, at 18-20 (examining operation of Exec. Orders 11,821 and
12,044); Tolchin, supra note 100, at 49.
120. See R. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER 10, 25-32 (1960); Tolchin, supra note 100, at 45,
49.
121. See Bliss, supra note 113, at 623, 634-37; Tolchin, supra note 100, at 47, 49.
122. See DeMuth, supra note 20, at 18; Verkuil, supra note 109, at 943, 951-52.
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Executive's use of internal management review as a political weapon,123 it
is not clear that the executive branch can effectively enforce internal man-
agement standards. Even with the best intentions, OMB is likely to be
forced into a reviewing posture in which the political desirability of regu-
lations is more important than whether the agency process that promul-
gated the rule was "openly informed, reasoned and candid."
C. The Legislative Proposals
The enforcement provisions of the legislative proposals are varied. Of
the two proposals that received the most attention in the 96th Congress,124
one relied upon OMB supervision1 21 combined with a legislative veto pro-
vision, 12 while the other merely required the Director of the Congres-
sional Budget Office to monitor compliance.'27 Of the two proposals re-
ceiving the most attention from the 97th Congress, 12  one calls for
monitoring by OMB,'29 and the other authorizes the President to establish
procedures for agency compliance with the requirements. 1 0
None of these proposals mandate judicial review of the internal man-
agement requirements. One major proposal from the 96th Congress, S.
262, flatly precluded judicial review 3 ' The other major proposal of the
96th Congress, H.R. 3263, precluded judicial review but called for inclu-
sion of the regulatory analysis in the record, allowing the courts to "con-
sider" it in determining the validity of the rule. 32 The committee report
123. See Eads, supra note 118, at 19 (suggesting that OMB will be "sharpshooter" taking aim
only at politically undesirable regulation); Washington Post, May 4, 1981, § A, at 5, col. 1 (sug-
gesting that enforcement will embody a "one-sided extension of Republican sympathy for business").
124. See supra note 74.
125. H.R. 3263, supra note 74, § 101(a) (proposed § 606) (instructing the Director of OMB to
"monitor and review" compliance and to "establish such procedures as may be necessary to ensure
compliance"). In addition, the Comptroller General of the United States was to monitor compliance
and report to Congress. Id. (proposed § 607).
126. Id. § 201(b)(1) (proposed § 553(h)(3)).
127. S. 262, supra note 74, § 102 (proposed § 606).
128. See supra pp. 749-50.
129. H.R. 746, supra note 76, § 101(b) (proposed § 624) (requiring that agency submit copy of
rule together with description of agency compliance with provisions of the bill to OMB, and that
OMB report to President and Congress on degree of compliance with bill by agencies). The Comp-
troller General is to monitor compliance as well. Id. (proposed § 625). In addition, the President or a
designee of the President within the executive branch may designate a rule as a "major rule." Id.
(proposed § 621(3)). See supra note 78.
130. S. 1080, supra note 76, § 4(a) (proposed § 624). The President may delegate the authority to
an officer within the Executive Office appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate. Id. (pro-
posed § 624). The President or the person selected under proposed § 624 may designate a rule as a
major rule. Id. (proposed § 622). See supra note 78.
131. See S. 262, supra note 74, § 102 (proposed § 607).
132. H.R. 3263, supra note 74, § 101(a) (proposed § 604) states:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, any determination by an agency concerning
the applicability of any of the provisions of this chapter to any action of the agency, including
any determination that a le is not a major rule, shall not be subject to judicial review.
(b) Any regulatory analysis prepared pursuant to section 602 and the compliance or non-
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explained that this preclusion-yet-inclusion mandate was designed to al-
low the court to read the analysis for background information, but to pro-
hibit review of the performance and conclusions of the analysis. The ade-
quacy of the regulatory analysis was to be, in itself, irrelevant to the
determination of whether a court should uphold the rule."'
Both of the proposals that have received substantial attention during the
97th Congress follow H.R. 3263 and contain preclusion-yet-inclusion pro-
visions. The relevant language of H.R. 746 is virtually identical to the
language of H.R. 3263.11" The language of S. 1080 differs slightly, and is
somewhat easier to construe as mandating judicial review."' But the far
compliance of the agency with the provisions of this chapter in preparing and adopting the
analysis shall not be subject to judicial review, except that the contents of the regulatory analy-
sis shall, to the extent relevant, be considered by a court when determining the validity of the
rule which is the subject of the regulatory analysis. When an action for judicial review of a
rule is instituted, any regulatory analysis prepared with respect to such rule shall constitute
part of the whole rulemaking record of agency action in connection with such review.
(c) Nothing in this section bars judicial review of any other impact statement or similar
analysis required by any other law if judicial review of such statement or analysis is otherwise
provided by law.
133.
[Slection 604 prohibits judicial review of the regulatory analysis itself. This includes the desig-
nation of a rule as a major rule or not as a major rule; an agency decision to perform or not to
perform a regulatory analysis; the nature or contents of such analysis; or the sufficiency of
conclusions of the analysis. The section expressly precludes a court from second-guessing either
the process or the conclusions of the analysis.
H.R. REP. No. 1393, supra note 88, at 43. The inclusion of the regulatory analysis in the record is
mandated solely because it
may be helpful to the court in understanding the context and nature of the agency's actions.
[I]f the record itself or the statement of basis and purpose accompanying the rule are
devoid of any justification for the rule, a court would be expected to reverse the agency's
action, regardless of what is contained in the regulatory analysis. The analyses may indicate
what the agency thinks the regulation means or how it is intended to work. If the analyses are
patently inconsistent with the agency's explanation of the rule itself, the court may well ask
whether the agency has provided a reasoned explanation for its action in adopting the rule.
But again, the court must base its decision on the rule itself, the record, and the statement of
basis and purpose, not on the contents or conclusions of the regulatory analysis.
Id. (emphasis added).
Similar sentiments were expressed by a member of the Carter Administration, which drafted H.R.
3263 and its identical Senate counterpart, S. 755, see Neustadt, supra note 71, at 149, and by the
Senator who introduced S. 262 and S. 755, see Ribicoff, For Effectiveness and Effciency: S. 262,
REGULATION, May-June, 1979, at 17, 18-19. Observers have generally interpreted the provisions in
accord with the intentions expressed in the committee report. See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note
74, pt. 1, at 441, 445 (statement of Susan B. King, Chairman, United States Consumer Product
Safety Commission); Gellhorn, Reform as Totem-A Skeptical View, REGULATION, May-June, 1979,
at 23, 24. But see Speech by Judge Harold Leventhal in Proceedings of the National Conference on
Federal Regulation: The Road to Reform, 32 AD. L. REV. 289, 293 (1980) (stating belief that courts
will ignore preclusion provision).
134. See H.R. 746, supra note 76, § 101(b) (proposed § 623). Cf supra note 132 (relevant lan-
guage of H.R. 3263).
135. Judicial review
(a) Compliance or noncompliance by an agency with the provisions of this subchapter shall
not be subject to judicial review except according to the provisions of this section.
(b) Any determination by the President or by the officer selected under section 624 of this
title that a rule is a major rule within the meaning of section 621(4)(A) of this title, and any
designation by the President or the officer selected under section 624 of this title that a rule is a
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greater explicitness of several provisions of S. 1080 that clearly intend
judicial review-one allowing a court to strike down an agency determi-
nation that a proposed rule is not "major," one allowing review of compli-
ance with certain procedures concerning particpation, and one requiring
the agency to maintain a rulemaking file-argues against that
construction." 6
Without explicit provision for judicial review, congressional efforts will
face the same enforcement difficulties that executive attempts have
faced."1 7 The addition of a legislative veto provision, given its possible un-
constitutionality and the inability of an overburdened Congress to monitor
more than a few rules, is not likely to cure the problem."'
III. A Proposed Solution: Legislative Endorsement of Judicial Imposi-
tion of the Internal Management Model
The analysis above suggests that each branch, acting by itself, is likely
to encounter substantial difficulty in imposing internal management stan-
dards upon agencies. This Note suggests one possible means of coordinat-
ing efforts: legislative endorsement of judicial review of the internal man-
agement requirements.
major rule under section 621(4)(B) of this title shall not be subject to judicial review in any
manner....
(d) Any regulatory analysis prepared under section 622 of this title shall not be subject to
judicial consideration separate or apart from review of the rule to which it relates. When an
action for judicial review of a rule is instituted, any regulatory analysis for such rule shall
constitute part of the whole rule making record of agency action for the purpose of judicial
review of the rule and shall, to the extent relevant, be considered by a court in determining the
legality of the rule.
S. 1080, supra note 76, § 4(a) (proposed § 623).
136. The provision concerning review of determinations that a rule is or is not "major" states:
The determination of an agency of whether a rule is or is not a major rule within the
meaning of section 621(4)(A) of this title shall be set aside by a reviewing court only upon a
clear and convincing showing that the determination is erroneous in light of the information
available to the agency at the time it made the determination. Any designation by an agency
that a rule is a major rule under section 621(4)(B) of this title shall not be subject to judicial
review in any manner.
S. 1080, supra note 76, § 4(a) (proposed 623(c)).
The provision concerning review of procedures as to participation begins: "No court shall hold
unlawful or set aside an agency rule because of a failure by the agency to use a particular procedure
pursuant to [the relevant subsection] unless . . . ." Id. § 3 (proposed § 553(c)(3)(B)).
The provision concerning review of whether the agency has maintained a rulemaking file, and
made it available to the public, was added as a floor amendment; it begins with the same terminology
as the provision concerning review of procedures as to participation. See 128 CONG. REC. S2702,
S2707 (1982) (floor amendment to S. 1080, supra note 76).
137. See supra pp. 754-57.
138. See supra notes 19-20.
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A. The Benefits of Legislatively-Endorsed Judicial Review of Internal
Management Requirements
The similarities between the purposes and most of the specific require-
ments of the Executive Orders and legislative proposals, on the one hand,
and the evolving judicial response to the problem of administrative discre-
tion, on the other, suggest that review of the internal management re-
quirements is a task for which courts have ample competence and experi-
ence. Thus, judicial review can be a powerful force in ensuring that
legislatively imposed internal management requirements are fulfilled.
Viewed from another perspective, legislative endorsement of judicial re-
view, by defining a set of requirements that the judiciary would legiti-
mately impose upon agencies, would eliminate the problems of legitimacy
and consistency that have thus far hindered judicial efforts to control
agency discretion through internal management review.
This second perspective also suggests significant "spill-over" benefits
from legislative endorsement. In detailing a set of requirements for "ma-
jor" rules, the legislative proposals also set the starting place for agency
and court consideration of non-major rules. They thus increase the possi-
bility that judicially imposed requirements for non-major rules will be
reasonably consistent among courts, and that agencies will be able to an-
ticipate those requirements.
It therefore appears that significant benefits can result from judicial re-
view of legislatively specified internal management requirements. It
should be noted, however, that some of the requirements of legislative pro-
posals are not internal management requirements but rather are substan-
tive mandates to agencies. As was noted above, the proposals require a
determination of whether a proposed rule is major.139 In addition, both
President Reagan's Executive Order and proposed S. 1080 require that an
agency, before it issues a rule, determine that the benefits of a proposed
rule outweigh its costs and that the proposal is the most cost-effective al-
ternative legally available to the agency.140 Judicial review of these provi-
sions thus cannot be endorsed based on the above analysis alone. Direct
review of these provisions would entail substantive determinations rather
than the validation of procedural propriety for which courts are most com-
petent and experienced.141
139. See supra note 78.
140. See S. 1080, supra note 76, § 4(a) (proposed § 622(d)(2)(B)); Exec. Order No. 12,291, §
2(b)-(e), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,193 (1981).
141. See supra pp. 743-45.
While this Note's analysis thus cannot be viewed as suggesting the desirability of judicial review of
substantive determinations, other arguments in favor of such review can be made. The problems asso-
ciated with judicial review of substantive requirements can be partially alleviated, perhaps, through
creative judicial action. For example, the courts may be able to limit delay, see infra note 142, by
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B. Objections to Judicial Review
Two main objections to judicial enforcement of the internal manage-
ment requirements have been raised. One is that judicial review would
substantially delay the promulgtion of rules."" The rules that are subject
to challenge under the proposals would, however, be subject to judicial
review in any case. No relaxation of standing requirements need accom-
pany a provision for judicial review of internal management requirements.
Nor would such a provision create an entirely new cause of action;143 the
analysis above suggests that judicial review of the legislative requirements
would simply invigorate an existing cause of action and make its applica-
tion more consistent.
Indeed, legislative endorsement of judicial review may actually reduce
court-induced delay. Agencies will no longer fail to comply based on a
lack of knowledge concerning the requirements, or a belief that they will
not be enforced. Greater consistency in judicial review of agency rulemak-
ing should thus result in fewer successful challenges to agency action.
Moreover, greater success in the courts will not necessarily be restricted to
"major" rules; the beneficial effects of the mechanisms that agencies estab-
summary rejection of all but the strongest challenges to agency determinations of whether a bill is
"major." They might also seek to convert review of the substantive questions into a more familiar
form by asking whether the agency has set up an internal management system to determine the sub-
stantive questions in a way that is "openly informed, reasoned and candid," instead of whether the
determination itself is correct. Furthermore, the alternatives to judicial review have their flaws as well.
Review by the executive branch may tend to become politicized, see supra p. 756, while no review
may lead to agency inaction, see supra note 92.
On the other hand, strong arguments can be made for OMB review. OMB has more expertise than
the courts to deal with the questions that will arise in review of these issues. See supra p. 743. Less
delay would be occasioned by OMB review as OMB could be given a limited time in which to
approve or disapprove the agency's decision. Indeed, OMB has demonstrated its ability to move quick-
ly. See MATERIALS, supra note 71, at 11 (estimating that OMB review of agency determinations of
whether rule was major took, on average, eight days). Most importantly, perhaps, given judicial re-
view of the management requirements, the bulk of the opportunity and hence temptation for illegiti-
mate use of the power to declare rules "major" will be eliminated.
To weigh the relative merits of these arguments would require investigations that are beyond the
scope of this Note.
142. The concern may be motivated by a perception of the deleterious effects of delay caused by
judicial review of the environmental impact statement (EIS). This Note does not consider whether
judicial review of the EIS is desirable; the analogy is inappropriate in relevant parts. First of all, the
Act that required the filing of an EIS also substantially lowered the requirements for standing to sue,
thus resulting in a substantial expansion of the class of potential plaintiffs. Furthermore, the EIS
requirement created an entirely new cause of action. The analysis above suggests, however, that a
challenge concerning whether an agency has fulfilled the regulatory analysis requirements does not
create an entirely new cause of action, but rather invigorates and makes more consistent an existing
cause of action. Finally, the enforcement of the EIS suffers from the same defect that this Note sug-
gests will be cured by judicial review of the requirements, that is, ambiguity concerning the legitimacy
of, and proper type and degree of, judicial enforcement.
143. In contrast, judicial review of the substantive provisions would create entirely new causes of
action, thus engendering delay. For example, judicial review of agency determinations that a proposed
rule is not "major" would give litigants opposing the regulation a new way to challenge the rule and
hence delay its promulgation.
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lish to ensure compliance with the internal management standards will
undoubtedly spill over to rules not subject to the regulatory analysis re-
quirements. That has, indeed, been the experience of the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), one of the few agencies to make more than a
half-hearted attempt to comply with Executive Order 12,044 and its pred-
ecessor.'" EPA reports that its attempts to comply with the Executive
Orders have resulted in greater court success against challenges to both
major and non-major rules.
1 45
The second major objection to judicial review of the legislatively man-
dated internal management requirements is that courts would be a dis-
torting force, demanding something other than what is intended by the
regulatory analysis requirements: courts would cause the agency to "write
regulatory analyses as legal briefs instead of candid assessments of hard
questions on which the data is often shaky," thus hindering the internal
management function of regulatory analysis and creating unnecessary de-
lay.146 As pointed out above, however, many courts have adopted internal
management review because of a recognition of their limited competence
and the need for candid assessments; they have thus supplemented weak
substantive review with demands for reasoned explanation, candid assess-
ments of uncertainties, and increased participation. Stated in strong form,
then, the objection is based on an error: the failure to comprehend that
judicial review of internal management standards is not only possible but
prevalent. 
47
A more limited form of the argument can be made, however. If Con-
gress orders courts to review compliance with internal management re-
quirements, any failure of an agency to comply fully with all aspects of
144. OMB REPORT, supra note 104, at A-80.
145. Speech by Douglas A. Costle in Proceedings of the National Conference on Federal Regula-
tion: The Roads to Reform, 32 AD. L. REV. 256, 256 (1980) ("Uludicial review has also been a major
influence [in EPA's decision to follow the regulatory analysis requirement]. Indeed, one of the key
motivating factors behind regulatory analysis at EPA is the realization that our rules must be able to
sustain the scrutiny of judicial review."); speech by Joan Bernstein in Proceedings of the National
Conference on Federal Regulation: The Roads to Reform, 32 AD. L. REV. 315, 315-16 (1980) (inter-
nal management requirements do not cause delay if consistently implemented).
146. Neustadt, supra note 71, at 149; see H. R. REP. No. 1393, supra note 88, at 43; Senate
Hearings, supra note 74, pt. 1, at 206 (statement of Charles L. Schultze, Chairman, Council of
Economic Advisors).
147. This failure to understand that internal management review is feasible and prevalent is per-
haps best illustrated by one critic's expression of his understanding of the function of judicial review.
Charles Schultze, the then-Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors that wrote S. 755, ex-
pressed his opposition to judicial review of regulatory analysis as follows:
The key function of the federal courts in reviewing administrative action is to evaluate the
substantive validity of decisions and to assure that individual rights have been respected in the
decision process. The court's function is not to second-guess internal mangement arrangements
or processes.
Senate Hearings, supra note 74, pt. 1, at 226. Schultze is far from alone in failing to perceive the
changes in the form of judicial review over the last decade. See DeLong, supra note 32, at 338-39.
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the requirements may result in an attempt to strike down the rule. Thus,
though internal management review has been developed, not as an end in
itself, but as a means of ensuring that agencies be "openly informed, rea-
soned and candid," pressure will be brought upon courts to demand a
formalistic touching of all bases instead of compliance with the purposes
of the requirements. Though plausible, this argument only points out the
need for judicial interpretation sensitive to intent rather than form, and
for careful drafting of the legislative authorization of judicial review. It
does not justify the preclusion of review.
C. Implications for Legislative Drafting and Judicial Interpretation
Legislatively endorsed judicial review of legislatively prescribed internal
management requirements can yield significant benefits, then, if imple-
mented by the legislature and the judiciary with proper care and attention
to the pitfalls. The legislature must recognize that court review of internal
management requirements is desirable, but distinguish those aspects of
regulatory analysis that do not fit the internal management pattern. Spe-
cifically, judicial review of agency determinations that a rule is major and
that the benefits of the rule exceed its costs must be justified, if at all, on a
different basis than judicial review of internal management requirements
for adequate notice, opportunity to participate, and explication.148
In addition, the legislature must endorse judicial review in a way that is
sufficiently unambiguous to avoid doubt that the courts will enforce the
requirements and that such enforcement is legitimate. The courts should
be clearly empowered to strike down rules that do not comply with the
internal management requirements.4 9 At the same time, however, the leg-
islature must avoid encouraging formalistic review."'
There is a tension between the last two requirements, a tension that
makes drafting the judicial review provision of the proposed statutes diffi-
cult. Any provision that clearly orders courts to review the requirements
opens the door for formalistic review; contrapositively, a provision that is
designed to avoid formalistic review will leave some ambiguity concerning
the extent and legitimacy of court review. The need for a clear signal to
agencies that the requirements will be enforced, along with the impor-
tance of legitimating the judicial role, suggests that the legislature should
err on the side of a clear mandate for judicial review. However the bal-
ance is struck, courts should interpret their mandate in a way that is con-
sonant with the purposes of the requirements and that avoids undue em-
148. See supra note 141.
149. Without this mandate it will be difficult for courts to avoid the problems they are currently
facing. See supra pp. 752-53.
150. See supra pp. 762-63.
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phasis on form.
From this perspective, the judicial review provisions of the major pro-
posals of the 96th and 97th Congresses seem to be far from optimal. The
flat preclusion of judicial review contained in S. 262 is obviously inade-
quate. The provisions of H.R. 3263 and H.R. 746 that preclude review
and yet call for inclusion of the regulatory analyses in the record contain
undesirable ambiguity, especially when read in conjunction with the asso-
ciated committee documents. The provisions of S. 1080 are perhaps most
subject to attack. S. 1080 clearly mandates direct review of the determina-
tion that a bill is not major, a type of review for which courts are less
competent and which is far more likely to occasion delay than review of
the internal management requirements, and yet leaves ambiguous the
courts' role in reviewing the internal management requirements.
If an ambiguous provision is enacted into law, the weight will fall upon
the courts to secure the benefits of proper judicial review. Courts can and
should interpret the ambiguous provisions as allowing them to strike
down a rule for failure to comply substantially with the internal manage-
ment requirements of the statute. ' The more desirable alternative, how-
ever, is a clear legislative mandate to that effect.
Conclusion
Legislative endorsement of judicial review of internal management re-
quirements can be a powerful force in creating agency action that is more
"openly informed, reasoned and candid." By making the agency-court re-
lationship more understandable and consistent, it can ameliorate distrust
and illegitimacy on the part of both parties. Achieving these benefits, how-
ever, requires proper drafting and proper judicial interpretation of the
authorizing statute. Current proposals should be amended clearly to au-
thorize the courts to strike down rules for failure to comply with the inter-
nal management requirements. With such authorization, courts should
measure compliance against the purposes of regulatory analysis and with-
stand the demands of private litigants for formalistic review. If ambiguous
provisions are enacted, the courts should interpret them as permitting ju-
dicial review for substantial compliance.
151. Cf Ackerman & Hassler, Beyond the New Deal: Coal and The Clean Air Act, 89 YALE
L.J. 1466, 1559-61 (1980) (urging courts to adopt principle of "textual priority," ignoring language
of committee reports, in reading agency-forcing statutes).
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